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Regulation-Induced Innovation  
for Sustainable Development
By Nicholas A. Ashford and Ralph P. Hall*
This article argues that regula-tion—properly fashioned—can transform products and processes 
in ways that confer economic, health, 
safety, and environmental benefits—
not only costs. In contrast, classical 
economic analysis of the relationship 
between health, safety, and environ-
mental regulation, on the one hand, and 
competitiveness, on the other, maintains 
that stringent regulation invariably 
increases production costs, diverting 
resources from R&D and hindering 
innovation. This assumption was chal-
lenged first in the late 1970s at MIT and 
made popular in 1991 by the so-called 
“Porter hypothesis.”
The Porter hypothesis and the relevant 
literature indicate that environmental, 
health, and safety regulation can induce 
dramatic innovations, not only by spur-
ring the development of new products 
or services by incumbent producers, but 
also by creating conditions in which 
new producers can enter the field. 
Regulation can do this when firms have, 
or are induced to have, the willingness, 
opportunity, and capacity to innovate. 
This literature, and the insights gleaned 
from it, provide an important set of clues 
for how regulation can be used to foster 
sustainability.
Based upon his research into the 
competitive advantage of nations, Porter 
claimed that “[s]trict environmental 
regulations do not inevitably hinder 
competitive advantage against foreign 
rivals; indeed, they often enhance it. 
Tough standards trigger innovation and 
upgrading.” He observed that “[p]roperly 
constructed regulatory standards, which 
aim at outcomes and not methods, will 
encourage companies to re-engineer 
their technology. The result in many  
cases is a process that not only pollutes 
less but lowers costs or improves  
quality. … Strict product regulations 
can also prod companies into innovat-
ing to produce less polluting or more 
resource-efficient products that will be 
highly valued internationally.” Porter’s 
hypothesis is that firms which respond 
to stringent regulation by developing 
new technologies have a “first mover” 
advantage and can capture the market 
for their products/services. Comparison 
of national competitiveness with 
good environmental governance and 
private-sector responsiveness supports 
the Porter hypothesis. Good economic 
management and good environmental 
management are related, and firms 
which succeed in developing innovative 
responses to environmental challenges 
benefit both environmentally and 
economically.
Earlier empirically based work on this 
concept dates back twelve years before 
Porter’s work, to research undertaken 
at MIT.  This earlier work showed how 
stringent and focused regulations in the 
U.S. chemical-producing and -using 
industries had the effect of stimulating 
fundamental product and process 
innovations. The MIT studies revealed 
that environmental and health and safety 
regulation—if appropriately designed, 
implemented, and complemented by 
economic incentives—can lead to radical 
technological developments that can 
significantly reduce exposure to toxic 
chemicals in the natural and working 
environments and in consumer products. 
Examples include regulation-induced 
replacement of poly-chlorinated 
biphenyls used in transformers by a 
silicone-based fluid, a new polymeriza-
tion process for polyvinylchloride, and 
textile-weaving innovation eliminating 
the need for a formaldehyde-containing 
resin that imparted permanent press 
properties to cloth.
A limitation of Porter’s hypothesis is 
that it focuses on how incumbent firms 
respond to more stringent regulations, 
but it ignores the important dynamics of 
new entrants. Porter and van den Linde 
argue that regulation, properly designed, 
can cause a regulated firm to undertake 
innovations that not only reduce pollu-
tion—which is a hallmark of production 
inefficiency—but also save on materials, 
water, and energy costs, conferring what 
Porter calls “innovation offsets” to the 
innovating firm (and what Ashford and 
his MIT colleagues called “ancillary 
benefits”). This can occur because the 
firm, at any point in time, is sub-optimal. 
If the firm is the first to comply with 
regulation in an intelligent way, other 
firms will later have to rush to comply 
and do so in a less thoughtful and more 
expensive way.  Thus, there are learning 
curve advantages to being first and early.
Given Porter’s focus on innovation 
offsets—i.e., the cost savings due to 
induced innovation that could exceed 
the cost of the regulation—he is 
mainly concerned with the costs to 
incumbent firms. However, it is possible 
to differentiate between “weak” and 
“strong” forms of the regulation-induced 
innovation hypothesis—a distinction 
that Porter does not make. In its weak 
form, as Porter observes, firms subject 
to more stringent regulation respond 
with product and process innovations. 
However, while environmental and 
worker health and safety improvements 
may be realized, the offending products 
and processes are only incrementally 
changed.
In contrast, in the strong form of the 
regulation-induced innovation hypoth-
esis, stringent regulation can stimulate 
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the entrance of entirely new products 
and processes into the market, thereby 
displacing dominant technologies. In this 
situation, unless incumbent firms have 
both the willingness and the capability 
to produce and compete with the new 
forms of technology, they too are likely 
to be displaced from the market. The 
figure below provides a simple diagram 
of the likely technological responses 
to the strong and weak forms of the 
regulation-induced innovation hypoth-
esis. Empirically based examples were 
researched by Ashford and his colleagues 
in their work.
While some question whether 
environmental regulation does generate 
a positive effect on innovation, their 
analyses tend to miss the essence of the 
strong form of the regulation-induced 
innovation hypothesis.  Although it 
is likely that stringent regulation will 
not stimulate technological innovation 
in most firms, some firms are likely 
to rise to the challenge and become 
technological leaders in the process. 
Hence, the evidence is necessarily 
anecdotal.  The Schumpeterian notion of 
“waves of creative destruction” leading 
to succeeding advances in technological 
development describes the process by 
which dominant technologies are being 
continually displaced as new technolo-
gies become available.
The design challenge facing govern-
ment is how existing undesirable 
technologies can be retired (or displaced) 
through a combination of regulation and 
market incentives. These ideas thus chal-
lenge the notion that incumbent firms 
will reinvent themselves in a significant 
way and should have a major role in 
setting the targets for future regulation. 
Incumbents will not set targets that they 
do not expect they can meet.
With regard to the weak form of the 
regulation-induced innovation hypoth-
esis, ambitious environmental policies in 
developed nations can lead to the forma-
tion of lead markets for environmental 
technologies. However, the evidence 
suggests that the international diffusion 
of environmental innovations must be 
accompanied by international policy 
diffusion, or the adoption by other coun-
tries of the induced innovation must be 
economically reasonable. Both of these 
factors make it difficult to predict with 
certainty whether an ambitious envi-
ronmental policy is likely to create a lead 
market for the international diffusion of 
innovations. The uncertainty surrounding 
the likely impacts on national industries 
of more stringent environmental, health, 
and safety regulation is seen as one reason 
why governments hesitate to implement 
such policies.
Stringent regulation can stimulate new 
entrants to introduce entirely new products 
and processes into the market—products 
and processes that will displace dominant 
technologies. One of several vivid exam-
ples is the displacement of Monsanto’s 
PCBs in transformers and capacitors 
by an entirely different dielectric fluid 
pioneered by Dow Silicone. Regulation 
can thus encourage disrupting innova-
tions by giving more influence to new 
customer bases, in which demands for 
improvements in both environmental 
quality and energy use and efficiency are 
more sharply defined and articulated. Of 
course, industries that would fear being 
displaced by new entrants would not be 
expected to welcome this regulation. 
This explains in part their resistance to 
regulation and their propensity to try 
to capture regulatory regimes, surrepti-
tiously or through direct negotiation 
with government.
In principle, regulation can be an 
effective and proper instrument for 
government to guide the innovation 
process. Well-designed regulation that 
sets new rules changes the institutional 
framework of the market. It can thus be 
an important element in creating favor-
able conditions for innovation that will 
enhance environmental sustainability and 
create incentives for the development 
of powerful lead markets, which pull 
innovation towards that sustainability. 
With regard to regulation, what seems to 
matter is not only the stringency, mode 
(specification versus performance stan-
dards), timing, uncertainty, focus (inputs 
versus product versus process) of the 
regulation, and the existence of comple-
mentary economic incentives—but also 
the inherent innovativeness (usually in 
new entrants) or lack of it (usually in 
the regulated firms) that the regulation 
engenders.
In order for innovation to occur, the 
firm (or government itself) must have 
the willingness, opportunity/motivation, and 
capability/capacity to innovate. These three 
factors affect each other, of course; but 
each is determined by more fundamental 
factors.
Willingness is determined by the 
following factors: (1) attitudes towards 
changes in production in general; (2) 
an understanding of the problem; (3) 
knowledge of possible options and 
solutions; and (4) the ability to evaluate 
alternatives. Improving factor (3) involves 
aspects of capacity building through the 
diffusion of information, through trade 
associations, government-sponsored 
education programs, inter-firm contacts, 
and the like. Changing attitudes towards 
changes in production, factor (1), often 
depends on the attitudes of managers and 
on the larger culture and structure of the 
organization, which may either stifle or 
encourage innovation and risk taking. 
Factors (2) and (4) depend on internal 
intellectual capacities. In the context of 
disrupting innovation by firms represent-
ing the dominant technology, willingness 
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Figure 1: A model for regulation-induced technological change for weak (Porter) and strong (Ashford/MIT) 
forms of the regulation-induced innovation hypothesis.
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is also shaped by the rare commitment of 
management to nurture new approaches 
that are at odds with its traditional value 
network or customer base.
Opportunity and motivation involve 
both supply-side and demand-side 
factors. On the supply side, technological 
gaps can exist between the technology 
currently used in a particular firm and 
the already-available technology that 
could be adopted or adapted (known 
as diffusion or incremental innova-
tion, respectively), or alternatively the 
technology that could be developed 
(i.e., significant sustaining or disrupting 
innovation). Consciousness of these 
gaps can prompt firms to change their 
technology, as can the opportunity for 
cost savings. Regulatory requirements 
can also define the changes that would 
be necessary to remain in the market. 
On the demand side, three factors could 
push firms towards technological change. 
These are: (1) opportunities for cost 
savings or expansion of sales; (2) public 
demand for more environmentally 
sound, eco-efficient, and safer industry, 
products, and services; and (3) worker 
demands and pressures arising from 
industrial relations concerns. The first 
factor could result from changes in the 
customer value networks. However, all 
these factors may stimulate change too 
late in the dominant technology firms, 
if new entrants have already seized the 
opportunity to engage in developing 
disrupting innovations.
Capability or capacity may actually be 
the most important and limiting factor 
and can be enhanced by: (1) an under-
standing of the problem; (2) knowledge 
of possible options and solutions; (3) 
the ability to evaluate alternatives; (4) 
resident/available skills and capabili-
ties to innovate; and (5) access to, and 
interaction with, outsiders. Knowledge 
enhancement/learning, factor (2), can 
be facilitated through deliberate or 
serendipitous transfer of knowledge from 
suppliers, customers, trade associations, 
unions, workers, other firms, and the 
available literature. The skill base of the 
firm, factor (4), can be enhanced through 
the education and training of opera-
tors, workers, and managers, on both a 
formal and informal basis, and through 
the deliberate creation of networks and 
strategic alliances that are not necessarily 
confined to a geographical area, nation, 
or technological regime.
Interaction with outsiders can 
stimulate more radical and disrupting 
changes. This last method of enhancing 
the capacity of firms to undertake tech-
nological change involves new outsider 
firms and stakeholders with which 
the firm has not traditionally been 
involved. Capacity to change may also 
be influenced by the innovativeness (or 
lack thereof) of the firm as determined 
by the maturity and technological 
rigidity of a particular product or 
production line. Some firms find it 
easier to innovate than others. The 
heavy, basic industries, which are also 
sometimes the most polluting, unsafe, 
and resource-intensive industries, 
change with great difficulty, especially 
when it comes to core processes. 
New industries, such as computer 
manufacturing, can also be polluting, 
unsafe (for workers), and resource and 
energy intensive, although they may 
find it easier to meet environmental 
demands. Government should not miss 
the opportunity to loosen the creative 
forces that bring about innovative 
changes that can simultaneously benefit 
the economy, the environment, and the 
general welfare. 
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contamination of underground drinking 
water sources. Significantly, “under-
ground injection” does not encompass 
the injection of fluids related to hydraulic 
fracturing. However, this exemption is 
limited solely to fracing fluids: it “does 
not extend to the disposal of any wastes, 
including drill cuttings, flowback water, 
or production brines.”
Both West Virginia and Ohio have 
primacy and administer the UIC 
programs within their respective states. 
Pennsylvania does not; UIC permits issue 
from the USEPA in that state. Following 
reuse/recycling, disposal by and through 
a permitted UIC well is the preferred 
means of disposal for oil and gas-related 
wastewater. In fact, in Ohio, the use of 
UIC wells is the only specific means of 
wastewater handling approved by statute. 
All other means of wastewater disposal 
must be approved on a case-by-case basis 
by the ODNR.
As a result of geology and other 
factors, these wells are located primarily 
in the state of Ohio, though development 
in West Virginia continues.
The permitting process includes 
the analysis of an “area of review” for 
each injection well, which must be 
conducted prior to injecting any fluids 
underground. This analysis includes the 
identification of a “zone of endangering 
influence” (“ZEI”), being the radius 
around the point of injection where, due 
to the pressure from injection, the poten-
tial exists for migration of the injection 
fluid, or fluids native to the injection 
formation, into an underground source 
of drinking water. The ZEI is calculated 
based upon the life expectancy of the 
well or pattern.
All permit applications must identify 
all wells within the “area of review” 
that penetrate formations that will be 
affected by the pressure increase from 
the injection, and address corrective 
actions in the event of such fluid migra-
tion. All proposed UIC wells “must be 
constructed to meet specific casing, 
cementing, logging and testing stan-
dards” and be “subsequently tested to 
demonstrate mechanical integrity.” Class 
II wells are also subject to long-term 
monitoring.
While the use of UIC wells continues 
to be the preferred means of addressing 
wastewater which is not reused or 
recycled, concerns regarding potential 
seismic activity related to underground 
injection may result in the development 
of additional safeguards to be part of the 
UIC permitting process. 
